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ABSTRACT
With the randomization approach, sensitive data items of
records are randomized to protect privacy of individuals while
allowing the distribution information to be reconstructed for
data analysis. In this paper, we distinguish between recon-
struction that has potential privacy risk, called micro recon-
struction, and reconstruction that does not, called aggregate
reconstruction. We show that the former could disclose sensi-
tive information about a target individual, whereas the latter
is more useful for data analysis than for privacy breaches. To
limit the privacy risk of micro reconstruction, we propose a
privacy definition, called (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy. Intu-
itively, this privacy notion requires that micro reconstruction
has a large error with a large probability. The promise of
this approach is that micro reconstruction is more sensitive
to the number of independent trials in the randomization
process than aggregate reconstruction is; therefore, reduc-
ing the number of independent trials helps achieve (ε, δ)-
reconstruction-privacy while preserving the accuracy of ag-
gregate reconstruction. We present an algorithm based on
this idea and evaluate the effectiveness of this approach us-
ing real life data sets.
1. INTRODUCTION
Randomization is one of the promising approaches in privacy-
preserving data mining. With this approach, sensitive data
items in records are randomized to protect the privacy of in-
dividuals while allowing the distribution information to be
reconstructed with reasonable accuracy. An early use of ran-
domization is randomized response (RR) for collecting re-
sponses on sensitive questions [19]. For example, to find the
percentage of employees stealing from the company, the em-
ployer asks each employee the question “do you steal from the
company?”. To prevent linking the responder to his/her sen-
sitive response, each employee submits the true answer (“Yes
or “No”) with a certain retention probability p and submits
an answer chosen from {Y es,No} at random with probabil-
ity (1 − p)/2. This type of randomization, also called input
perturbation, is extended to categorical values in privacy pre-
serving data mining for mining association rules [8, 2, 9, 17].
Randomization is also studied in privacy preserving data pub-
lishing where a data publisher has collected the original data
D and wants to release a sanitized version D∗ for data mining
[3, 11, 16, 22, 4].
In this paper, we consider the data publishing scenario in
which the data set D contains both non-sensitive attributes
(e.g., age, gender, etc.) and a sensitive attribute (e.g., dis-
ease), as in most realistic settings. We assume that an ad-
versary has named a target individual, t, whose record is con-
tained in D, and has figured out somehow the non-sensitive
attributes of t. The adversary’s goal is to infer the sensitive
attribute of t. To preserve the privacy of individuals, the sen-
sitive attribute value in each record is randomized following
a certain retention probability p, while allowing reconstruc-
tion of distribution information such as the count of records
in D satisfying a given predicate ϕ. We show that, with the
help of non-sensitive attributes, the adversary could recon-
struct the distribution of the sensitive attribute for a target
individual, even if major privacy definitions are satisfied. If
this distribution is skewed, the target individual’s privacy is
breached. This attack is termed “reconstruction attack”.
1.1 Reconstruction Attacks
One major privacy definition is limiting the change in ad-
versary’s confidence in the sensitive value x of a given record
as a result of interacting with or exposure to the database.
For example, the ρ1-ρ2 privacy proposed in [8] states that
if the prior probability Pr[X = x] is not more than ρ1, the
posterior probability Pr[X = x|Y = y], given the published
data D∗, should not be more than ρ2, where ρ1 < ρ2 and X
and Y are the variables for the original and perturbed sen-
sitive values in a record, respectively. In the literature [8, 3,
2, 22, 4], Pr[X = x] is measured by the fraction of records
with X = x in the whole table D, and Pr[X = x|Y = y] is
measured by the fraction of records with X = x among the
records with Y = y in the whole table D∗. Precisely,
Pr[X = x | Y = y] =
Pr[X = x] · p[x→ y]∑
x Pr[X = x] · p[x→ y]
where p[x → y] is the probability that x is perturbed to
y, and can be determined by the retention probability p.
Note that these measurements do not take into account the
non-sensitive attributes of records in D or the acquired non-
sensitive information about the target individual t. The next
example shows that with non-sensitive information, the ad-
versary could infer the sensitive information of t with a prob-
ability higher than ρ2, even if ρ1-ρ2 privacy is ensured.
Example 1 (Attacks on ρ1-ρ2 privacy). Let D con-
tain 10 × k records over the sensitive attribute Disease and
the non-sensitive attributes {Gender,Age}, where k is an in-
teger and Disease has the domain {x1, · · · , x10}. Suppose
that k records in D have Gender = M and Age = 30, all of
which have the value x1 for Disease. Let g denote this set of
records. x2-x10 are uniformly distributed among the remain-
ing 9 × k records in D. Note, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, Pr[X = xi] =
10%, and 0.1-0.5 privacy ensures Pr[X = xi|Y = y] ≤ 50%
for all xi. This level of privacy can be achieved by retaining
the original value in a record with probability 50% and per-
turbing xi randomly to a different value (i.e., {x2, · · · , x10})
with probability (1 − 0.5)/9 [8, 3, 4]. Let g∗ denote the ran-
domized version of g.
Suppose that an adversary wants to infer the disease of
the target individual t = Bob having the non-sensitive infor-
mation Gender = M and Age = 30. The adversary could
estimate the (relative) frequencies of x1, · · · , x10 in g based
on g∗, instead of D∗, because all other records in D∗ do not
match t’s non-sensitive information. Let 〈F ′1, · · · , F
′
10〉 be the
estimated frequencies in g. For a sufficiently large g (by using
a large k) and a reasonable estimator such as the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE), F ′1 will be sufficiently close to
the true frequency f1 [2], which is 100%. Consequently, the
adversary is able to infer that t has the disease x1 with a
probability larger than ρ2 = 0.5.
A recent breakthrough in privacy definition is differential
privacy [7]. The idea is hiding the presence or absence of a
participant in the database by making two neighbor data sets
(nearly) equally probable for giving the produced query an-
swer. Precisely, the λ-differential privacy mechanism ensures
that, for any two data sets D and D′ differing on at most one
record, for all queries Q, and for all query outputs o′,
Pr[K(D,Q) = o′] ≤ exp(λ)Pr[K(D′, Q) = o′]
With a small λ, exp(λ) is close to 1, so D and D′ are almost
equally likely to be the underlying database that produces
the final output of the query. To ensure this property, the
λ-differential privacy mechanism adds the noise ξ to the true
answer o and publishes the noisy answer o′ = o+ ξ, where ξ
follows the Laplace distribution Lap(b) = 1
2b
exp(− |ξ|
b
), b =
1/λ. The next example shows that such noisy answers can
be exploited to estimate the likelihood of the sensitive value
for a target individual.
Example 2 (Attacks on differential privacy). Consider
the D and t again in Example 1. An adversary could in-
fer the distribution of Disease for t by issuing two queries
Q1 and Q2: Q1 asks for the count of records that satisfy
“Gender = M ∧ Age = 30” and gets the noisy answer o′1 =
o1 + ξ1, and Q2 asks for the count of records that satisfy
“Gender =M∧Age = 30∧Disease = x1” and gets the noisy
answer o′2 = o2+ξ2, where oi are the true answers and ξi are
the noises added, i = 1, 2. Note that the relative error ξi
oi
gets
smaller as the true answer oi gets larger, because ξi has the
zero mean and the variance 2b2, where b = 1/λ is a constant
for a given λ-differential privacy mechanism. Therefore, as
the answer o1 increases, o
′
2/o
′
1 approaches o2/o1, the fraction
of records having x1 among the records that share the gender
and age with t. This discloses the disease x1 of t because
o2/o1 = 100%.
In these examples, randomized data or noisy query answers
are used to reconstruct the distribution of sensitive informa-
tion for a target individual, even though strong privacy defi-
nitions are satisfied. If such reconstruction is accurate and if
the true distribution is skewed, as in these examples, the re-
constructed distribution discloses the sensitive information of
the target individual with a high probability. This attack is
powerful in that it works on different types of randomization
techniques and data sharing scenarios, i.e., the random value
replacement in Example 1, through either input perturbation
or data publishing; random noise addition to query answers
in Example 2, also known as output perturbation.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions in this work are as follows.
• For the first time, we consider the implication of non-
sensitive attributes on sensitive reconstruction of data
distribution from randomized data. We distinguish two
types of reconstruction: The micro reconstruction seeks
to reconstruct the distribution of the sensitive attribute
in a set of records that fully match a target individ-
ual on all non-sensitive attributes; the aggregate recon-
struction aims to reconstruct the distribution in a set
of records that only partially match a target individual.
We argue that micro reconstruction is all we have to be
concerned with about privacy risk.
• To address the privacy risk of micro reconstruction, we
propose a notion of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy to en-
sure a minimum value on the tail probabilities of micro
reconstruction error. We present a bound conversion
theorem that converts between a bound on tail probabil-
ities of a random variable and a bound on tail probabil-
ities of reconstruction error, which allows us to leverage
the Chernoff bound to develop a testable instantiation
of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy. Since the bound con-
version theorem does not hinge on the particular form
of bounds, our approach can be instantiated to other
upper bounds and modified to constrain lower bounds
of tail probabilities.
• The promise of this approach is that micro reconstruc-
tion is more sensitive to the number of independent
trials in the randomization process than aggregate re-
construction, analogous to the fact that the first 10 coin
flips are more critical for the estimation of head prob-
ability than the second 10 coin flips. We leverage this
difference to design an algorithm for achieving (ε, δ)-
reconstruction-privacy while preserving the utility of
aggregate reconstruction.
• Empirical evaluation on real life data sets presents two
important findings: Firstly, (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy
is violated even when major privacy definitions such
as ρ1-ρ2 privacy and differential privacy are satisfied.
Secondly, the additional information loss incurred for
achieving (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy is small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work. Section 3 defines the problem stud-
ied in this work. Section 4 presents an efficient instantia-
tion of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy. Section 5 presents the
algorithm to achieve (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy. Section 6
presents empirical findings. Finally, we conclude the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Two classes of randomization methods have been exten-
sively studied in the literature: random perturbation and ran-
domized response. Random perturbation is primarily used
for quantitative data. For example, Agrawal and Srikant [1]
build accurate decision tree classification models on the per-
turbed data, and Kargupta et al. [12] point out that arbitrary
randomization can reveal significant amount of information
under certain conditions. Randomized response is primar-
ily used for categorical data. Its basic idea was proposed by
Warner [19], and based on this technique the problem of min-
ing association rules from disguised data was studied in [8, 9,
17]. In this paper, the term “perturbation” or “randomiza-
tion” refers to the randomization for categorical data.
Techniques for probabilistic perturbation have also been
investigated in the statistics literature. The PRAM method
[10] considers the use of Markovian perturbation matrices.
The disclosure risk is measured by a notion of expectation
ratios, defined as the ratio of the expected number of records
in the perturbed file with the observed value equal to the
value in the original file, and the expected number of records
in the perturbed file with the observed value not equal to the
value in original file.
Formal definitions of privacy breaches were proposed in
[8, 6] following the same paradigm: for every record in the
database, the adversary’s confidence in the values of the given
record should not significantly increase as a result of inter-
acting with or exposure to the database. Recent works based
on such definitions include [16, 11, 3, 2, 22, 4]. These ap-
proaches either consider one attribute (i.e., the sensitive at-
tribute) [11], or assume that all attributes are sensitive [16, 3,
2], or ignore the role of non-sensitive attributes in the recon-
struction of the sensitive attribute in the context of privacy
risk [22, 4]. Reconstruction of data distribution is tradition-
ally considered as utility. To our knowledge, our work is the
first to study such reconstruction as privacy breaches.
An alternative to the randomization approach is the par-
tition based approach in which the records are partitioned
to ensure some sort of balanced distribution of sensitive data
items in each partition [14, 21]. The randomization approach,
due to its non-deterministic nature, is more robust to auxil-
iary information [13, 20, 18].
The differential privacy mechanism [7] hides the presence of
a single record in the database by adding random noises to a
query answer. As we will see in Section 6, such noise addition
is not sufficient to prevent the adversary from reconstructing
the distribution of sensitive data for a target individual.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We assume that the data publisher has collected a table
D(NA,SA) on non-sensitive attributes NA = {A1, · · · , Ad}
and one sensitive attribute SA. Each record in the table
corresponds to a participant or individual. For a record r in
D, r[NA] and r[SA] denote the values of r on NA and SA.
| · | denotes the cardinality of a set. The sensitive attribute
SA has a discrete domain {x1, · · · , xm}. The count of xi
refers to the number of records having xi, and the frequency
of xi refers to the percentage of records having xi. As in [3,
8, 2, 11], we assume that the SA value in a record is chosen
independently at random according to some fixed probability
distribution. The publisher allows the researcher to learn this
distribution, but wants to hide the SA value of an individual
record.
3.1 Perturbation
We consider the data publishing scenario where the data
publisher wants to publish D for data analysis, but wants to
hide the SA value in a record. In the uniform perturbation [3,
8, 2, 11], the SA value x in a record is processed by flipping
a coin with head probability 0 < p < 1, called retention prob-
ability. If the coin lands on heads, x is retained; otherwise,
x is replaced with a random value from the domain of SA,
where each value is selected with probability (1−p)/m. This
perturbation process is parameterized by the perturbation
matrix Pm×m:
Pji =
{
p+ 1−p
m
if j=i (retain xi)
1−p
m
if j 6=i (perturb xi to xj)
(1)
p + 1−p
m
is the sum of the probability that xi is retained
and the probability that xi is replaced with the same xi.
Let D∗ contain all perturbed records. For any subset S of
D, S∗ denotes the same set of records as S in D∗. Note
|S∗| = |S|. The choice of p dictates the trade-off between
the privacy concern of hiding the sensitive value in a record
and the utility for reconstructing the distribution of SA. The
work in [8, 4] determines the maximum retention probability
p for ensuring a given ρ1-ρ2 privacy [8] based on ρ1, ρ2, and
m.
The above perturbation process has some interesting prop-
erties. First, it modifies only the SA attribute, not NA
attributes. Therefore, data analysis involving only NA at-
tributes incurs no information loss by accessing the random-
ized data D∗. This is an advantage compared to the dif-
ferential privacy mechanism [7] where a query answer will
be distorted even if it only involves non-sensitive attributes.
Second, the perturbation of a record depends on the original
SA attribute in the record, but not on any other records in
D. Therefore, for any subset S of records from D, we can
assume that S∗ is produced by the same perturbation matrix
P. This record independence also implies that insertion and
deletion of records on D can be done through insertion and
deletion of randomized records on D∗.
We consider data analysis through answering count queries.
A count query has a predicate ϕ of the form ∧(A = a), where
A is either SA or an attribute in NA, and a is a value from
the domain of A. The answer to the query is the count of
the records in D satisfying ϕ. This answer must be estimated
using D∗. If ϕ contains no equality for SA, the answer on D∗
is exactly same as the answer on D. If ϕ contains an equality
SA = xi, a reconstruction process will be applied to the sub-
set of records in D∗ that satisfy ϕ−, where ϕ− is ϕ with the
equality SA = xi removed. Let S
∗ be this subset and let S
be the set of corresponding records in D. The reconstruction
seeks the most likely estimator of the distribution of SA in
S, denoted by
←−
F ′, given S∗ and the perturbation operator P.
The answer for the query is estimated by |S|F ′i , where F
′
i is
the component of
←−
F ′ for xi. The detailed reconstruction will
be discussed in Section 4.1.
3.2 Adversaries and Micro Reconstruction
We assume that an adversary has named some target in-
dividual, denoted t, whose record is contained in D, and has
figured out t’s values on all non-sensitive attributes NA. To
infer the SA value of t, the adversary needs to reconstruct
the frequencies
←−
F ′ of SA values from the randomized data
D∗. Given the knowledge about t’s information on all non-
sensitive attributes in NA, the adversary would focus the
reconstruction process on the records in D∗ that match all
t’s non-sensitive attributes. The next definition formalizes
this reconstruction.
Definition 1 (Micro/Aggregate Reconstruction).
A micro group is a set of the records in D that agree on all
attributes in NA. The micro reconstruction seeks to recon-
struct the distribution of SA in a micro group. For a target
individual t, gt denotes the micro group containing t’s record
and g∗t denotes the set of corresponding records in D
∗. An
aggregate group is a set of the records in D that agree on
zero or more but not all attributes in NA. The aggregate
reconstruction seeks to reconstruct the distribution of SA in
an aggregate group.
The intent of distinguishing these two types of reconstruc-
tion is that micro reconstruction is all we have to be con-
cerned with about privacy risk - aggregate reconstruction
does not present privacy risk. The next example illustrates
this point.
Example 3. Let NA = {Gender, Job} and SA = Disease.
Consider a target individual t (say Bob) with Gender =Male
and Job = Teacher. The micro group for t, gt, contains
all records in D with Gender = Male and Job = Teacher.
The micro reconstruction for t seeks to reconstruct the dis-
tribution of SA in gt using the published g
∗
t . This recon-
struction is most relevant to t because gt contains all and
only the records in D that match t’s non-sensitive informa-
tion. In contrast, aggregate reconstruction involves records
that do not match t′ information in at least one of Gender
and Job, such as (1) all records for Job = Teacher, or
(2) all records for Gender = Female, or (3) all records for
Gender = Female∧ Job = Teacher, or (4) all records in D.
These reconstructions are less relevant to t because they are
based on more records that do not belong to t. For example,
a high estimated frequency of Breast Cancer in (1) does not
mean that t has a high chance of getting Breast Cancer be-
cause most occurrences of Breast Cancer actually come from
female teachers.
In the above, we distinguish two types of reconstruction
based on the set of records in which the data distribution is
estimated. For each type of reconstruction, we can distin-
guish two types of estimates based on the records used to
derive the estimate. In Example 3, we estimate the distribu-
tion of SA in gt based on the records in g
∗
t . Alternatively,
we can treat gt as the difference X − Y of two sets X and
Y , where S ⊆ X and Y = X − S, and estimate the distri-
bution of SA in gt based on the estimates for X and Y . For
example, for the set of male teachers, gt, gt = X − Y , where
X is the set of all teacher records in D and Y is the set of
all female teacher records in D. If F ′X and F
′
Y are the esti-
mated frequencies of Breast Cancer in X and Y based on X∗
and Y ∗, respectively, we can estimate the frequency of Breast
Cancer in gt by (F
′
X |X| − F
′
Y |Y |)/|gt|. The next definition
summarizes these two types of estimation.
Definition 2 (Local/Global Estimates). For any sub-
set S of D and any SA value x, the local estimate for x wrt
S is based on the information in S∗, and a global estimate
for x wrt S is given by (F ′X |X| − F
′
Y |Y |)/|S|, where S ⊆ X,
Y = X − S, and F ′X and F
′
Y are the local estimates of x wrt
X and Y , respectively.
Every local estimate is a global estimate in the special case
of X = S and Y = ∅. At first glance, there is a temptation
for considering global estimates because the use of a superset
X∗ is in favor of accurate reconstruction. However, we will
show that all global estimates are in fact equal to the local
estimate in Section 4.1.
Table 1: Notations
Symbols Meaning
m the domain size |SA|
t a target individual
S a subset of records in D
S∗ the corresponding set of S in D∗
g a micro group
g∗ the corresponding set of g in D∗
x a domain value of SA
f the frequency of x in S
O∗ the variable for the observed count of x in S∗
F ′ the variable for the local estimate of f
←−
f ,
←−
F ′,
←−
O∗ the column-vectors of f , F ′, O∗
P the perturbation matrix in Equation (1)
p the retention probability
3.3 Problems
We are now ready to define the problem we will study.
We adapt the notation in Table 1 in the rest of the paper.
For each target individual t, the micro reconstruction for t
reconstruct the distribution of SA most relevant to t. If the
distribution is skewed and if the reconstruction is accurate, t’s
SA information will be disclosed. To limit this privacy risk,
the next definition formalizes a privacy definition through
bounding the accuracy of micro reconstruction.
Definition 3 ((ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy). For a
micro group g, g∗ is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private, where ε ≥ 0
and δ ∈ [0, 1], if for each SA value x occurring in g, whenever
Pr
[
F ′−f
f
> ε
]
< U or Pr
[
F ′−f
f
< −ε
]
< L, δ ≤ min{U, L},
where f is the frequency of x in g and F ′ is the variable for
a global estimate of f over the random instances of g∗. D∗
is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private if g∗ is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-
private for every micro group g.
Remark 1. (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy ensures that the
(best) upper bounds on tail probabilities for micro reconstruc-
tion error greater than ε or smaller than −ε are not smaller
than δ. In this sense, the adversary has difficulty to lower
the probabilities of a large estimation error. The larger the
parameters ε and δ are, the greater this difficulty is and the
more secure the published data is. In this definition, δ is a
constraint on the upper bounds of tail probabilities (i.e., U
and L). This formulation allows us to leverage the extensive
research on upper bounds of tail probabilities in the literature.
Alternatively, δ could be a constraint on the lower bounds of
tail probabilities if such bounds are available, and from Theo-
rem 2, our approach does not hinge on whether U and L are
upper bounds or lower bounds. In this definition, we consider
the estimate F ′ estimated from randomized data. In Section
6.3, we will show that the same privacy notion can be ap-
plied to F ′ estimated from noisy query answers such as those
produced by the differential privacy mechanism.
Definition 4 (The Problem). Given a data set D, a
retention probability p for randomization, ε, and δ, where ε ≥
0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], we want to produce a randomized version D∗
that satisfies (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy while information
for aggregate reconstruction is preserved.
Two main problems are to be solved: how to test if (ε, δ)-
reconstruction-privacy is satisfied, and how to achieve (ε, δ)-
reconstruction-privacy on a given data set. We answer the
first question in Section 4 and answer the second question in
Section 5.
4. TESTING PRIVACY
We first present an estimation technique for F ′ and then
present a probabilistic bound for the estimation error of F ′.
In the discussion below, the reader is referred to the notations
in Table 1.
4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimator
We adapt the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) as our
model of local estimates. The next theorem follows from
Theorem 2 in [2].
Theorem 1 (Theorem 2, [2]). For a subset of records
S and any SA value x,
←−
F ′ computed by P−1 ·
←−
O∗
|S|
is the max-
imum likelihood estimator (MLE) of
←−
f in S, under the con-
straint ΣF ′ = 1, where Σ is over all elements of
←−
F ′.
In the rest of the paper,
←−
F ′ denotes the MLE computed
by Theorem 1. The presence of the matrix inversion P−1
makes it troublesome to compute
←−
F ′ and develop a proba-
bilistic error bound for
←−
F ′. The next lemma gives an efficient
computation of
←−
F ′.
Lemma 1 (Computing
←−
F ′). For any subset S of D and
any SA value x, (i) E[O∗] = |S|(fp + (1− p)/m), (ii) F ′ =
O∗/|S|−(1−p)/m
p
, and (iii) E[F ′] = f .
Proof. (i) Let Xk be independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) indicator variables for the event that the
k-th row in S∗ has the SA value x. O∗ = ΣkXk. From
the matrix P in Equation (1), if the k-th row in S has x,
Xk = 1 with probability p + (1 − p)/m, and if the k-th row
in S does not have x, Xk = 1 with probability (1 − p)/m.
So E[O∗] = |S|f(p + (1 − p)/m) + |S∗|(1 − f)(1 − p)/m) =
|S|(fp + (1− p)/m). This shows (i).
(ii) From Theorem 1,
←−
F ′ = P−1 ·
←−
O∗
|S|
. Let [α]m denote a
column-vector of the constant α of the length m. We have
←−
O∗
|S|
= P ·
←−
F ′ = p
←−
F ′ + [
1− p
m
ΣF ′]m = p
←−
F ′ + [
1− p
m
]m
The last equation holds because
∑
F ′ = 1 (Theorem 1).
Thus, O
∗
|S|
= pF ′ + 1−p
m
, equivalently, F ′ = O
∗/|S|−(1−p)/m
p
,
as required for (ii).
(iii) Taking the mean on both sides of F ′ = O
∗/|S|−(1−p)/m
p
,
we get E[F ′] = E[O
∗]/|S|−(1−p)/m
p
. Substituting E[O∗] in (i)
into the last equation and simplifying, we get E[F ′] = f .
This shows (iii).
From Lemma 1(ii), F ′ can be computed directly from the
observed count O∗ without computing the matrix inversion
P
−1. From Lemma 1(iii), F ′ is an unbiased estimator of f .
The next lemma shows that, for the MLE model of local
estimates, all global estimates are equal to the local estimate.
Lemma 2. For any subset S of D and any SA value x,
every global estimate for x wrt S is equal to the MLE for x
wrt S.
Proof. From Definition 2, every global estimate wrt S
has the form
F ′X |X|−F
′
Y |Y |
|S|
, where S ⊆ X ⊆ D and Y =
X − S, and F ′, F ′X , F
′
Y are the MLEs wrt S,X, Y , respec-
tively. Let S∗, X∗, Y ∗ be the sets of records inD∗ correspond-
ing to S,X, Y , and let O∗, O∗X , O
∗
Y be the variables for the
counts of x in S∗, X∗, Y ∗, respectively. From Lemma 1(ii),
F ′X =
O∗X/|X|−(1−p)/m
p
and F ′Y =
O∗Y /|Y |−(1−p)/m
p
. Substi-
tuting these into
F ′X |X|−F
′
Y |Y |
|S|
, noting |S| = |X| − |Y | and
O∗ = O∗X −O
∗
Y , we get
O∗/|S|−(1−p)/m
p
, which is equal to the
MLE F ′ given by Lemma 1(ii). This shows that every global
estimate for x is equal to the MLE F ′ for x.
Consequently, it suffices to consider only local estimates.
The next definition refines Definition 3 by considering only
local estimates and will be used in the remaining discussion
about (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy.
Definition 5 ((ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy (Refined)).
For any micro group g, g∗ is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private,
where ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], if for each SA value x occurring
in g, whenever Pr
[
F ′−f
f
> ε
]
< U or Pr
[
F ′−f
f
< −ε
]
< L,
then δ ≤ min{U, L}, where f is the frequency of x in g and F ′
is the variable for the MLE of f under the constraint ΣF ′ = 1.
4.2 Probabilistic Error Bounds
A remaining question is how to bound Pr
[
F ′−f
f
> ε
]
and
Pr
[
F ′−f
f
< −ε
]
. We leverage tail probabilities of random
variables in the literature to develop such bounds. Recall
that O∗ is the observed count of a SA value and F ′ is the
reconstructed frequency of a SA value. The next theorem
gives a conversion between a probabilistic bound for F ′ and
a probabilistic bound for O∗.
Theorem 2 (Bound Conversion). Consider any sub-
set S of D and any SA value x. Let µ = E[O∗]. For any
upper tail bound function U(θ, µ) and lower tail bound func-
tion L(θ, µ), and for any comparison operator
⊕
(i.e., < or
>),
1. Pr
[
O∗−µ
µ
> θ
]⊕
U(θ, µ) if and only if Pr
[
F ′−f
f
> ε
]
⊕
U( ε|S|pf
µ
, µ);
2. Pr
[
O∗−µ
µ
< −θ
]⊕
L(θ, µ) if and only if Pr
[
F ′−f
f
< −ε
]
⊕
L( ε|S|pf
µ
, µ).
Proof. We show (1) only because the proof for (2) is simi-
lar. From Lemma 1(ii), F ′ = O
∗/|S|−(1−p)/m
p
, O∗ = |S|(F ′p+
(1− p)/m), and from Lemma 1(i), µ = |S|(fp + (1− p)/m).
So
O∗ − µ
µ
> θ ⇔ O∗ − µ > θµ
⇔ |S|p(F ′ − f) > θµ
⇔
F ′ − f
f
>
θµ
|S|pf
= ε.
These rewriting implies that the probabilities on the two sides
of (1) are equal. Then (1) follows because θ = ε|S|pf
µ
.
From Theorem 2, if we have a tail probability bound for the
error of O∗ (i.e., U(θ, µ) and L(θ, µ)), we immediately have
a tail probability bound for the error of F ′ (i.e., U( ε|S|pf
µ
, µ)
and L( ε|S|pf
µ
, µ)). Moreover, if the bound for O∗ is the best,
the corresponding bound for F ′ is also the best (otherwise, a
better bound for O∗ can be obtained from Theorem 2). Im-
portantly, the bound conversion does not hinge on the par-
ticular form of the bound functions U and L. This generality
allows us to adapt to the best bounds U and L available for
O∗ to get the best bounds for F ′.
There is a rich literature on the upper bounds for tail prob-
abilities of random variables. The Markov’s inequality ap-
plies to any non-negative random variable, therefore, applies
to O∗. The Chebyshev’s inequality uses knowledge of the
standard deviation to give a tighter bound. However, these
bounds are very poor for random variables that fall off expo-
nentially with distance from the mean. The Chernoff bound,
due to [5], gives exponential fall-off of probability with dis-
tance from the mean. The critical condition that is needed
for the Chernoff bound is that the random variable be a sum
of independent Poisson trials.
Theorem 3 (Chernoff Bounds, [5, 15]). Let X1, · · · , Xn
be independent Poisson trials such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Xi ∈
{0, 1}, Pr[Xi = 1] = pi, where 0 < pi < 1. Let X =
X1 + · · · + Xn and µ = E[X] = E[X1] + · · · + E[Xn]. For
θ ∈ (0,∞),
Pr
[
X − µ
µ
> θ
]
< U1(θ, µ) =
(
eθ
(1 + θ)(1+θ)
)µ
(2)
and for θ ∈ (0, 1],
Pr
[
X − µ
µ
< −θ
]
< L1(θ, µ) =
(
e−θ
(1− θ)(1−θ)
)µ
(3)
These full Chernoff bounds are quite tight but can be clumsy
to compute. Using the Taylor series expansion ln(1 + θ) =∑
i≥1(−1)
i+1 θi
i
and ignoring higher order terms, the above
bounds can be simplified to the following weaker bounds,
which covers 95% of cases pretty well: For θ ∈ (0,∞),
Pr
[
X − µ
µ
> θ
]
< U2(θ, µ) = exp(−
θ2
2 + θ
µ) (4)
and for θ ∈ (0, 1],
Pr
[
X − µ
µ
< −θ
]
< L2(θ, µ) = exp(−
θ2
2
µ). (5)
The Chernoff bound applies to our variable O∗ because
O∗ is the sum X1 + · · ·+Xn, where each Xi is the indicator
variable whether the i-th row in S∗ has a particular SA value
x, and E[O∗] = |S|(fp+(1−p)/m) (Lemma 1). Instantiating
the upper bounds Ui and Li for O
∗ in Equations (2)-(5) into
Theorem 2, the next corollary gives the corresponding upper
bounds for F ′.
Corollary 1 (Upper bounds for F ′). Let Ui and Li
be defined in Equations (2)-(5). For θ ∈ (0,∞),
Pr
[
F ′ − f
f
> ε
]
< Ui(θ, µ) (6)
and for θ ∈ (0, 1],
Pr
[
F ′ − f
f
< −ε
]
< Li(θ, µ) (7)
where θ = ε|S|pf
µ
and µ = |S|(fp + (1− p)/m).
Corollary 1 gives the concrete upper bounds Ui and Li
on the tail probabilities of F ′ based on the Chernoff bound.
Since these bounds are public, (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy
implies δ ≤ min{Ui, Li}. The question is whether δ ≤
min{Ui, Li} is sufficient for (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy, in
other words, whether there are tighter (i.e., smaller) upper
bounds than Ui and Li. To answer this question, we observe
from Theorem 2 that any tighter bound for F ′ would lead
to a tighter bound than the Chernoff bound for O∗. The
fact that the Chernoff bound has been used as the state-
of-the-art technique in the past 60 years suggests that it is
nontrivial to improve the Chernoff bound. For this reason,
we assume that Corollary 1 gives the best upper bounds for
F ′; however, if better bounds on random variables become
available, they can be easily adapted through Theorem 2 to
obtain better bounds for F ′. This observation leads to the
following instantiation of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy based
on the Chernoff bound.
Corollary 2 (Testing (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy).
With the upper bounds Ui and Li in Equations (2)-(5), for a
micro group g, for ε ∈ (0, 1 + (1−p)/m
pf
] and δ ∈ [0, 1], g∗ is
(ε, δ)-reconstruction-private if and only if, for every SA value
in g,
δ ≤ min{Ui(θ, µ), Li(θ, µ)} (8)
where θ = ε|g|pf
µ
and µ = |g|(fp+ (1− p)/m).
The range (0, 1+ (1−p)/m
pf
] of ε corresponds to the common
range (0, 1] of θ for all of Equations (2)-(5). The condition in
Equation (8) can be tested efficiently because all parameters
in θ and µ are known to the data publisher.
5. ACHIEVING PRIVACY
We now consider the second major question: how to achieve
(ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy on the published data D∗ for a
given data set D. Corollary 2 gives an efficient condition for
(ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy, but it does not provide a clue
on how to achieve this condition if it fails. As the first step
towards an answer, we rewrite Equation (8) into a constraint
on the size |g| of a micro group g. Then we present an algo-
rithm to enforce this constraint. Below, we consider (L1, U1)
and (L2, U2) separately.
Theorem 4. With the upper bounds U1(θ, µ) and L1(θ, µ)
in Equations (2) and (3), for a micro group g, ε ∈ (0, 1 +
(1−p)/m
pf
], and δ ∈ [0, 1], g∗ is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private if
and only if, for the maximum frequency f of any SA value
occurring in g,
|g| ≤
ln δ
w ln
(
e−θ
(1−θ)(1−θ)
) (9)
where w = fp+ (1− p)/m and θ = εpf
w
.
Proof. First, we show two claims. Let X = e
θ
(1+θ)(1+θ)
and Y = e
−θ
(1−θ)(1−θ)
.
Claim 1: for θ ∈ (0, 1], X ≥ Y , thus, min{L1, U1} = L1.
Note X
Y
approaches 1 as θ approaches 0. To show the claim,
it suffices to show that X
Y
is non-decreasing, equivalently, the
derivative of X
Y
wrt θ is non-negative for θ ∈ (0, 1]. Note
ln
X
Y
= 2θ + (1− θ) ln(1− θ)− (1 + θ) ln(1 + θ)
Differentiating both sides wrt θ, we get
Y
X
(
X
Y
)′ = 2+[− ln(1−θ)+(1−θ)
−1
1− θ
]−[ln(1+θ)+(1+θ)
1
1 + θ
]
and
(
X
Y
)′ = −
X
Y
ln(1− θ2) ≥ 0
The last inequality follows because X and Y are non-negative
and θ is in (0, 1]. This shows Claim 1.
Claim 2: for θ ∈ (0, 1], Y is in (0, 1) and is non-increasing.
We show that the derivative of Y is non-positive (thus, Y is
non-increasing) for θ ∈ (0, 1]. Then the claim follows from
the fact that Y approaches 1 as θ approaches 0.
ln Y = −θ − [(1− θ) ln(1− θ)]
Differentiating both sides wrt θ gives
Y ′ = Y [−1− (− ln(1− θ) + (1− θ)
−1
1− θ
) = Y ln(1− θ) ≤ 0
The last inequality follows because Y is non-negative and θ
is in (0, 1]. This shows Claim 2.
From Claim 1, L1(θ, µ) ≤ U1(θ, µ), so Equation (8) degen-
erates into δ ≤ L1(θ, µ) = Y
µ, and ln δ ≤ µ ln Y = |g|w ln Y .
From Claim 2, Y is in (0, 1), so ln Y < 0, and |g| ≤ ln δ
w lnY
.
As f increases, w and θ = εp
p+ 1−p
mf
increase, and from Claim
2, Y is in (0, 1) and is non-increasing, thus, ln Y is decreas-
ing. Since both ln δ and lnY are negative, ln δ
w lnY
is mini-
mized when f is maximized. So Equation (8) degenerates
into Equation (9).
Observe that the right-hand side of the condition in Equa-
tion (9) is a constant if the maximum frequency f is kept
unchanged. The idea of our algorithm to enforce this con-
dition is reducing |g| while keeping f unchanged. The next
theorem gives a similar rewriting based on the bounds L2 and
U2 in Equations (4) and (5).
Theorem 5. With the upper bounds U2(θ, µ) and L2(θ, µ)
in Equations (4) and (5), for a micro group g, ε ∈ (0, 1 +
(1−p)/m
pf
], and δ ∈ [0, 1], g∗ is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private if
and only if, for the maximum frequency f of any SA value
occurring in g,
|g| ≤=
−2 ln δ
wθ2
(10)
where w = fp+ (1− p)/m and θ = εpf
w
.
Proof. For θ ≥ 0, L2(θ, µ) ≤ U2(θ, µ), so Equation (8)
degenerates into δ ≤ L2(θ, µ), where θ =
ε|g|pf
µ
and µ = |g|w.
Note θ = εpf
w
= εp
p+ 1−p
mf
. As f increases, θ and µ = |g|w in-
crease, hence, L2(θ, µ) = exp(− θ
2
2
µ) decreases. Therefore, it
suffices to consider the maximum frequency f in g for check-
ing δ ≤ L2. The rest of the proof follows from the following
rewriting:
δ ≤ exp(−
θ2
2
µ)⇔ µ ≤ −
2 ln δ
θ2
⇔ |g| ≤
−2 ln δ
wθ2
In the rest of this section, we develop an algorithm for
achieving (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy based on Theorem 5,
but a similar algorithm can be developed based on Theo-
rem 4. According to Theorem 5, if |g| ≤ sg fails, where
sg =
−2 ln δ
wθ2
, g∗ is not (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private. There are
several options to restore this inequality. One option is in-
creasing sg by reducing either the retention probability p or
the maximum frequency f in g. Another option is decreasing
|g| by discarding some records. None of these options is de-
sirable because they either make the data set more random
or distort the global data distribution.
Our observation is that |g| in Equation (10) really refers
to the number of independent Poisson trials in the random-
ization process for generating g∗. This can be seen from
µ = E[O∗] = |g|(fp + (1 − p)/m) (Lemma 1(i)) where |g| is
the number of indicator variables Xk for the event that the
k-th row in g∗ has a particular SA value x (see the proof
of Lemma 1). Since the upper bounds in Equations (2)-(5)
decrease exponentially in µ, reducing |g| is highly effective to
increase these upper bounds, which helps restore the inequal-
ity in Equation (10), provided that the frequency f remains
unchanged. At the same time, we want to preserve the fre-
quency of each SA value to minimize the distortion to data
distribution. To meet both requirements, we shall randomize
a sample g1 of g and scale the randomized data g
∗
1 back to
the original size |g|. The key is to preserve the frequency of
each SA value in both sampling and scaling operations. This
task is performed by the following three functions. Assume
|g| > sg.
1. Sampling(g, sg): this function takes a sample of the size
sg from g such that the number of records for each SA
value is reduced by the same fraction. Let b = sg/|g|
(note b < 1). For each SA value x occurring in g, let g1
contain any ⌊|gx|b⌋ records from gx and one additional
record from gx with probability |gx|b − ⌊|gx|b⌋, where
gx denotes the set of records in g for x. Note that all
records in gx are identical. Return g1. This step reduces
the number of independent trials to sg while preserving
the frequency of each SA value.
2. Perturbing(g1, p,m): this function randomizes the SA
values of the records in g1 as described in Section 3.1
and returns the randomized g∗1 .
3. Scaling(g∗1 , |g|): this function scales up g
∗
1 to the orig-
inal size |g| while preserving the frequency of each SA
value. Let b′ = |g|/|g∗1 |. For each record r
∗ in g∗1 , let g
∗
2
contain ⌊b′⌋ duplicates of r∗ and one additional dupli-
cate of r∗ with probability b′ − ⌊b′⌋. Return g∗2 . Note
that the duplication does not increase the number of
independent trails because all duplicates of t∗ originate
from the same independent trial for r∗.
The algorithm based on the above idea is described in Al-
gorithm 1. The input consists of D, p,m, ε, δ and the output
is D∗2 . For each micro group g, if |g| ≤ sg, g
∗
2 is equal to
g∗. Otherwise, g∗2 is produced by the three steps on Lines 7-9
described above. D∗2 contains all g
∗
2 .
Example 4. Suppose that a micro group g contains 5 records
for x1 and 15 records for x2. |g| = 20, |gx1 | = 5, |gx2 | = 15.
Assume sg = 15. Since |g| > sg, Sampling(g, sg) produces
a sample g1 of g as follows. b = sg/|g| = 0.75. g1 contains
⌊5 × 0.75⌋ = 3 records from gx1 and one additional record
from gx1 with probability 5 × 0.75 − 3 = 75%; g1 contains
⌊15 × 0.75⌋ = 11 records from gx2 and one additional record
from gx2 with probability 15× 0.75− 11 = 25%. Suppose that
after coin flips, g1 contains 4 records from gx1 and 11 records
from gx2 . Perturbing(g1, p,m) produces the randomized ver-
sion of g1, g
∗
1 .
Scaling(g∗1 , |g|) scales up g
∗
1 to the size |g| as follows. b
′ =
|g|/|g∗1 | = 20/15 = 1.33. For each record r
∗ in g∗1 , g
∗
2 contains
⌊b′⌋ = 1 duplicate of r∗ and contains one additional duplicate
with probability 1.33−1 = 33%. Suppose that after coin flips,
one additional duplicate for x1 is chosen, and four additional
duplicates for x2 are chosen. So g
∗
2 contains 5 records for x1
and 15 records for x2. In general, |g
∗
2 | may not be exactly
equal to |g|.
We show that D∗2 produced by Algorithm 1 satisfies some
interesting properties with respect to privacy and utility. Con-
sider a micro group g such that |g| > sg. Let g1, g
∗
1 , g
∗
2 be
computed for g in Algorithm 1, and let O∗g , O
∗
g1 , O
∗
g2 be the
observed count of a particular SA value x in g∗, g∗1 , g
∗
2 . Let
fg and fg1 be the frequency of x in g and g1. Let F
′
g, F
′
g1 , F
′
g2
be the MLEs reconstructed from g∗, g∗1 , g
∗
2 . u ≃ v denotes
that u and v are equal modulo the coin flips in Scaling and
Sampling. It is easy to see a few simple facts:
• Fact 1: fg1 ≃ fg , that is, Sampling preserves the fre-
quency of x in g. This is because the count of every x
in g is reduced by the same factor b modulo the coin
flips.
• Fact 2: O∗g2/|g
∗
2 | ≃ O
∗
g1/|g
∗
1 |, that is, Scaling preserves
the frequency of x in g∗1 . This is because each record in
g∗1 is duplicated b
′ times modulo the coin flips.
Algorithm 1 Achieving Reconstruction Privacy
Input: D, p,m, ε, δ
Output: Randomized D∗2 that is (ǫ, δ)-reconstruction-private
1: D∗2 ← Ø
2: for all micro groups g in D do
3: compute sg =
−2 ln δ
wθ2
using Equation (10)
4: if |g| ≤ sg then
5: g∗2 ← Perturbing(g, p,m)
6: else
7: g1 ← Sampling(g, sg)
8: g∗1 ← Perturbing(g1, p,m)
9: g∗2 ← Scaling(g
∗
1 , |g|)
10: add g∗2 to D
∗
2
11: return D∗2
Sampling(g, sg):
1: temp← Ø
2: b← sg/|g|
3: for all SA value x occurring in g do
4: gx ← the set of records in g having x
5: add to temp any ⌊|gx|b⌋ records from gx
6: add to temp one additional record from gx with prob-
ability |gx|b− ⌊|gx|b⌋
7: return temp
Perturbing(g1, p,m):
1: temp← Ø
2: for all record r in g1 do
3: let r∗ be r with SA perturbed with retention probabil-
ity p
4: add r∗ to temp
5: return temp
Scaling(g∗1 , |g|):
1: b′ ← |g|/|g∗1 |
2: temp← Ø
3: for all record r∗ in g∗1 do
4: add to temp ⌊b′⌋ duplicates of r∗
5: add to temp one additional duplicate of r∗ with prob-
ability b′ − ⌊b′⌋
6: return temp
• Fact 3: F ′g1 ≃ F
′
g2 , that is, g
∗
1 and g
∗
2 give the same es-
timate of fg . This follows from F
′
gi =
O∗gi
/|g∗i |−(1−p)/m
p
,
i = 1, 2 (Lemma 1(ii)) and Fact 2.
• Fact 4: E[O∗g2 ] ≃ E[O
∗
g ] and |g
∗| ≃ |g∗2 |. |g
∗| ≃ |g∗2 |
follows from Sampling and Scaling. From Lemma 1(i),
E[O∗g ] = |g|(fp+(1−p)/m) and E[O
∗
g1 ] = sg(f1p+(1−
p)/m). Since Scaling duplicates each x occurrence in g∗1
|g|
sg
times, E[O∗g2 ] ≃
|g|
sg
E[O∗g1 ] = |g|(f1p + (1 − p)/m).
Then Fact 1 implies E[O∗g2 ] ≃ E[O
∗
g ].
Theorem 6 (Privacy). For each micro group g, g∗2 is
(ε, δ)-reconstruction-private.
Proof. If |g| ≤ sg, g
∗
2 is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private (The-
orem 5). We assume |g| > sg. g
∗
1 is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-
private because |g1| ≃ sg1 (Theorem 5). |g1| ≃ sg1 follows be-
cause fg1 ≃ fg (Fact 1) implies sg ≃ sg1 , and from |g1| ≃ sg,
|g1| ≃ sg1 . Facts 1 and 3 imply
F ′g2
−fg
fg
≃
F ′g1
−fg1
f1
. So,
Pr[
F ′g2
−fg
fg
> ε] ≃ Pr[
F ′g1
−fg1
fg1
> ε], and Pr[
F ′g2
−fg
fg
< −ε] ≃
Pr[
F ′g1
−fg1
fg1
< −ε]. Since g∗1 is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-private,
so is g∗2 .
Below, we show that F ′2 has the same mean as F
′. Let S
be any set of micro groups, and let S∗ and S∗2 be the sets of
corresponding records in D∗ and D∗2 , respectively. For any
SA value x, let F ′2 denote the estimated frequency of x in S
based on S∗2 and let F
′ denote the estimated frequency of x
in S based on S∗.
Theorem 7 (Utility). E[F ′2] ≃ E[F
′].
Proof. Let O∗2 =
∑
g∈S O
∗
g2 and O
∗ =
∑
g∈S O
∗
g . Let
|S∗| =
∑
g∈S |g
∗| and |S∗2 | =
∑
g∈S |g
∗
2 |. From Lemma 1(ii),
E[F ′] = E[O
∗]/|S∗|−(1−p)/m
p
and E[F ′2] =
E[O∗2 ]/|S
∗
2 |−(1−p)/m
p
.
From Fact 4, |S∗| ≃ |S∗2 | and E[O
∗] ≃ E[O∗2 ], which implies
E[F ′] ≃ E[F ′2].
Despite E[F ′2] ≃ E[F
′], F ′2 will have a larger error than F
′
due to the reduced number of independent trials for S∗2 . This
is exactly what we want in order to restore (ε, δ)-reconstruction-
privacy. However, the error increase for aggregate reconstruc-
tion is smaller than that for micro reconstruction because ag-
gregation reconstruction involves more than one micro group.
We will evaluate this claim empirically in Section 6.
6. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
This empirical study aims to answer two questions: The
first question is “to what extent is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy
violated assuming that major privacy definitions are satis-
fied?”. The second question is “what price will be paid
for having (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy?” Section 6.1 intro-
duces our data sets and utility metrics. Section 6.2 presents
the findings in the data publishing setting and Section 6.3
presents the findings in the output perturbation setting.
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Figure 1: Frequency Distribution for SA
6.1 Experimental Setup
Data Sets. We utilize the real CENSUS data contain-
ing personal information of 500K American adults, previ-
ously used in [21],[14], and [4]. Table 2 shows the 7 dis-
crete attributes of the data. Two base tables were generated
from CENSUS. OCC denotes the base table with Occupa-
tion as the sensitive attribute (SA) and the remaining at-
tributes as the non-sensitive attributes (NA). EDU denotes
the base table with Education as the sensitive attribute (SA)
and the remaining attributes as the non-sensitive attributes
(NA). OCC-n and EDU-n denote the samples of cardinal-
ity n, where n = 100K, 200K, 300K, 400K, 500K. Figure 1
shows the frequency distribution of SA for OCC-300K and
EDU-300K. EDU-300K has a more skewed distribution than
OCC-300K.
Table 2: Number of Values in Attributes
Attributes Domain Size
Age 77
Gender 2
Education 14
Marital 6
Race 9
Work-class 7
Occupation 50
Count Queries. We evaluate the utility of data analysis
through count queries of the following form
SELECT COUNT (∗) FROM D
WHERE A1 = a1 ∧ · · · ∧Ad = ad ∧ SA = xi
(11)
where {A1, ..., Ad} is a subset of non-sensitive attributes and
aj is a value from the domain of Aj , j = 1, . . . , d, and xi is
a value from the domain of SA. The answer to the query,
denoted by ans, is the count of records in D that satisfy the
predicate in the WHERE clause. Since our primary inter-
est is in aggregate information, we consider only queries that
have at least 0.1% selectivity, where the selectivity is defined
as ans/|D|. This means that d is restricted to be 1, 2, or 3 be-
cause a query for any larger d has a selectivity less than 0.1%.
We generate a pool of 5,000 queries as follows. For each a
query, we randomly select d from {1, 2, 3} with equal proba-
bility and randomly select d non-sensitive attributes without
replacement. For each attribute Ai selected, we randomly
choose a value ai from the domain of Ai. Finally, we ran-
domly choose a value xi from the domain of SA and create a
query following the template in Equation (11). If the query
has a selectivity of 0.1% or more, we add it to the pool. This
process is repeated until the pool contains 5,000 queries.
Table 3: Parameter Table
Parameters Settings
p 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
ε 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
δ 0.14, 0.22, 0.3, 0.38, 0.46
|D| 100K, 200K, 300K, 400K, 500K
6.2 Findings in Data Publishing
In the data publishing scenario, the randomized data D∗ is
published and a query is answered usingD∗ and a reconstruc-
tion process as described in Section 3.1. Our study focuses
on two questions: (i) To what extent is (ε, δ)-reconstruction-
privacy violated onD∗? (ii) What additional price is incurred
for the protection of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy? To answer
the first question, we study the percentage of violating micro
groups in D∗ that fail to satisfy (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy.
To answer the second question, we measure the (average)
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Figure 2: EDU: % of Violating Micro Groups in D∗
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Figure 3: EDU: Comparison of Relative Error for Count Queries
relative error for answering the count queries in our query
pool, defined as |est−ans|
ans
, where ans is the true answer and
est is the estimated answer. We compare the relative error
generated using D∗2 produced by Algorithm 1, denoted by RP
(for reconstruction privacy), with the relative error generated
usingD∗ produced by the standard uniform perturbation, de-
noted by UP. Both methods use a retention probability p to
randomize the data, thus, ensure some uncertainty of the SA
value in a record such as ρ1-ρ2 privacy. According to [8, 3,
4], the maximum p for providing ρ1-ρ2 privacy is p =
γ−1
m−1+γ
,
where γ = ρ2
ρ1
× 1−ρ1
1−ρ2
and m = |SA|. Additionally, RP has
the parameters ε and δ for (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy. We
consider the settings of p, ε, δ, and |D|, shown in Table 3.
The default settings are in boldface.
6.2.1 Findings on EDU Data Sets
Figure 2 shows the percentage of violating micro groups in
D∗ vs p, ε, δ, and |D|. Here are several observations. Firstly,
there is a nontrivial percentage of micro groups that violate
(ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy. A larger retention probability
p leads to more violating micro groups. The violation dimin-
ishes when p becomes very small (i.e., less than 20%), but
in this case aggregate reconstruction is affected significantly
because D∗ is too noisy, as shown by the larger relative error.
A larger ε or δ leads to more violating micro groups due to a
more restrictive privacy constraint. A larger data cardinality
|D| leads to more violating micro groups. This is because a
larger |D| leads to a larger |g|, i.e., more independent trials
when generating g∗, thus, a more accurate reconstruction.
In fact, |g| ≤= −2 ln δ
wθ2
is more likely to be violated as |g|
increases.
For each experiment in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows the rela-
tive error of UP and RP. Note that, in Figure 3 (b)(c), UP
remains constant because UP does not depend on ε and δ.
The most significant finding is that, across all of p, ε, δ, and
|D|, the error of RP is only slightly more than the error of
UP. This point can also be seen by cross-examining Figure 2
and Figure 3: the increase of error for RP is much slower than
the increase in the percentage of violating micro groups. The
reason is that the error boosting of RP through reducing the
number of independent trails has less effect on queries that
involve a large set of records. This finding supports our claim
that the proposed method does not compromise the utility of
aggregate information. For p and |D|, the trend in Figure 2
and Figure 3 is opposite: as p or |D| increases, the percentage
of violating micro groups increases, but the error of estimated
query answers decreases. This makes sense because violating
micro groups are caused by high accuracy of estimated query
answers.
6.2.2 Findings on OCC Data Sets
We performed a similar study on the more balanced OCC
data sets. Figure 4 shows the percentage of violating micro
groups and Figure 5 shows the relative error, respectively.
As we can see, the findings are quite similar to those of EDU
data sets.
6.3 Findings on Output Perturbation
Although Definition 3 is based on reconstruction from a
randomized dataD∗, the notion of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy
is applicable to any reconstruction. In this experiment, we
consider reconstruction from noisy query answers in the out-
put perturbation scenario. We assume that differential pri-
vacy [7] is in place. The λ-differential privacy mechanism
adds random noises ξ to the query answer o and publishes the
noisy answer o′ = o+ ξ, where ξ follows the Laplace distribu-
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Figure 4: OCC: % of Violating Micro Groups in D∗
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Figure 5: OCC: Comparison of Relative Error for Count Queries
tion Lap(b) = 1
2b
exp(− |ξ|
b
), b = 1/λ. λ determines the noise
level. We show that even if differential privacy is satisfied,
there is a concern about violation of (ε, δ)-reconstruction-
privacy. We use EDU-500K and OCC-500K.
For each data set, we pick 7 micro groups g that have the
largest maximum frequency f of any SA value, among those
with |g| > 70 for EDU-500K and |g| > 100 for OCC-500K.
For each of these groups, g, let f and F ′ be the true and
estimated frequencies of the most frequent SA value x in g.
F ′ is computed by the noisy answers to two queries Q1 and
Q2 constructed similar to those in Example 2. Let oi be the
true answer and let o′i be the noisy answer for Qi, i = 1, 2.
f = o2/o1 and F
′ = o′2/o
′
1. By treating Pr[
F ′−f
f
> ε]
and Pr[F
′−f
f
< −ε] as the upper bounds of these proba-
bilities themselves, (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy is violated if
Pr[F
′−f
f
> ε] < δ or Pr[F
′−f
f
< −ε] < δ. To compute these
probabilities, we generated the noisy answers o′1 and o
′
2 100
times and considered the fraction of the cases for F
′−f
f
> ε
and F
′−f
f
< −ε. The numbers for these cases are in Tables 4
and 5.
Take Group 7 in Table 4 (in boldface) for EDU-500K as an
example. For λ = 0.1 and ε = 0.3, there are 8 cases for > ε
and 8 cases for < −ε. Intuitively, this says that, out of the 100
noisy answers (o′1, o
′
2) examined, 8 cases have an error greater
than 30% and 8 cases have an error less than −30%. In other
words, the estimate F ′ falls within the ±30% interval with
the confidence level of 84%. The privacy concern comes from
the fact that the frequency of x in g is more than 70% (shown
in the column “f in g”), which is significantly higher than the
2.5% in the whole data setD (shown in the column “f inD”).
Thus, even if the ±30% interval is large, F ′ discloses a much
higher probability of having x for the individuals in g than
for the individuals in D. Similar disclosures are observed on
the more balanced OCC-500K. For λ = 0.1 and ε = 0.2,
Group 2 in Table 5 (in boldface) shows a ±20% error interval
with the confidence level of 84%. Although the frequency f
of x in this group is only 47%, it is significantly higher than
the frequency of 2.4% in the whole data set. Therefore, F ′
discloses quite a bit about the SA value of the individuals in
this group.
At λ = 0.05, a larger error for F ′ has been observed due
to the increased noise level. However, since λ is a constant
for a given λ-differential privacy mechanism, the error for F ′
can be reduced by a sufficiently large group size |g| and fre-
quency f in g. To provide (ε, δ)-reconstruction-privacy, the
λ-differential privacy mechanism has to employ a very small
λ. This solution shares the same drawback with the solu-
tion of using a small retention probability p, i.e., choosing
the global noise parameters, i.e., λ and p, according to the
worst case of any micro group in the data set. As discussed
in Section 6.2.1, this type of solutions destroys both micro re-
construction and aggregate reconstruction, making the data
useless for all queries.
7. CONCLUSION
Reconstruction of data distribution is traditionally regarded
as utility. In this work, we showed that reconstruction could
lead to privacy breaches even if major privacy definitions are
satisfied. We formalized a privacy definition to address this
risk and presented an enforcement solution. A novelty of this
work lies at the distinction between reconstruction that has
privacy risk and reconstruction that does not. We leveraged
this distinction to meet the dual requirement of privacy and
utility. Another novelty is the independence on the partic-
ular form of the bounds on tail probabilities. Our privacy
Table 4: EDU-500K: the Number of Cases for F
′−f
f
> ε and F
′−f
f
< −ε
Micro Group g |g| f in g f in D
λ = 0.1 λ = 0.05
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3
> ε < −ε > ε < −ε > ε < −ε > ε < −ε
1 89 0.87 0.025 18 13 14 7 34 29 24 22
2 74 0.77 0.025 25 23 14 7 32 32 28 23
3 138 0.76 0.172 11 9 8 3 18 27 20 15
4 104 0.76 0.172 21 12 9 6 35 28 22 22
5 104 0.75 0.172 23 14 11 6 35 25 21 28
6 77 0.74 0.025 26 11 18 11 26 39 27 26
7 102 0.72 0.025 18 13 8 8 32 31 29 21
Table 5: OCC-500K: the Number of Cases for F
′−f
f
> ε and F
′−f
f
< −ε
Micro Group g |g| f in g f in D
λ = 0.1 λ = 0.05
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3
> ε < −ε > ε < −ε > ε < −ε > ε < −ε
1 142 0.48 0.038 13 18 11 4 29 29 27 20
2 213 0.47 0.024 8 8 3 0 23 19 15 11
3 111 0.47 0.026 26 18 16 13 40 30 27 29
4 113 0.45 0.024 28 20 17 8 38 30 23 25
5 153 0.45 0.026 18 15 6 6 20 40 26 21
6 237 0.45 0.024 8 9 3 3 17 21 13 12
7 143 0.44 0.038 12 17 12 6 38 34 27 20
definition is a constraint on the upper bounds of tail proba-
bilities and the Chernoff bound in particular. This formula-
tion allows us to leverage the upper bound literature to de-
velop a concrete solution to the problem identified. However,
our approach can be instantiated to other upper bounds and
modified to constrain the lower bounds of tail probabilities,
thanks to the general form of the bound conversion theorem
(Theorem 2).
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